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Loans are illiquid assets that can be sold in a secondary market even that buyers
have no certainty about their quality. I study a model in which a lender has access
to new investment opportunities when all her assets are illiquid. To raise funds, the
lender may either borrow using her assets as collateral, or she can sell them in a sec-
ondary market. Given asymmetric information about assets quality, the lender cannot
recover the total value of her assets. There is then a role for the government to correct
the information problem using ﬁscal tools.
Keywords: Loan Sales, Asymmetric Information, Liquidity, Securitization.
JEL Codes: G21, G28.
1 Introduction
The ﬁrst sales of mortgage loans through a securitization mechanism occurred in the
1970s. Since then, the issue of securities based on illiquid assets, as bank loans, has
been increasingly widespread. In an asset–backed securitization, a lender sells loans that
are converted into securities, which in turn are negotiable in a secondary market. Finan-
cial intermediaries are highly interested on selling some of their loans, since this is a way
to obtain capital for new investments. Despite the recent ﬁnancial crisis originated by
the securitization of subprime mortgages, loan sales using the asset-backed securitization
mechanism is a good alternative for ﬁnancial intermediaries to raise capital.
∗This paper beneﬁted from useful comments by Enrique Gilles, Dario Maldonado, Jorge Ponce, Jean-
Charles Rochet and Anna Toldrà. All remaining errors are my own. Toulouse School of Economics
and Facultad de Economía, Universidad del Rosario - Bogotá. E-mail: monica.vargas61@urosario.edu.co
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authors and not necessarily reﬂect the view of the Department of Economics at Universidad del Rosario.
1Banks have special skills to be the best monitors of debtors (see Diamond (1984,
1991), Besanko and Kanatas (1993)). These ﬁnancial intermediaries specialize in a moni-
toring technology, and they have interest on maintaining a business relationship with ﬁnal
debtors. This is true even when banks sell the loans that constitute the main link to bor-
rowers. Indeed, the original lenders continue to be in charge of collecting the principal
and interest payments from borrowers and, in many cases, borrowers are not even aware
their debts have been sold and converted into securities. The structure of bank loan se-
curitization has been designed to lessen possible moral hazard problems concerning the
monitoring of borrowers by lenders.
Theloan–backedsecuritizationstructure, brieﬂydescribedinthenextsection,isknown
for being a complex process that is often hard to understand for ﬁnal investors. When buy-
ing securities, investors do not have all the information about the quality of the assets they
are buying. To correct that information problem, credit rating agencies (CRAs) make
evaluations of the assets the securities are based on. The ﬁnal price of those securities
depends on that evaluation and on the structure of the securities (guarantee, payments
forms, etc.), so CRAs play a key role on the asset backed securitization. However, with
the recent global ﬁnancial crisis originated by the securitization of subprime mortgages,
CRAs have lost credibility and it turns important to ﬁnd new mechanisms to correct the
asymmetric information problem. This paper is concerned with that key question.
The aim of this paper is to explore the use of loan securitization to raise funds when
there is asymmetric information between lenders and investors. I have developed a model
in which a lender has access to new investment opportunitieswhen having only an illiquid
asset: loans. The lender has two alternatives to raise capital: either sell her assets (or part
of them) in a secondary market (i.e. to securitize); or borrow from ﬁnanciers using her
assets as collateral. The objective is to ﬁnd a mechanism through which the lender may
ﬁnd the maximum amount of funds, taking into account that she is the only one who
knows the quality of her assets.
Because of the information problem we have obtained that, in both alternatives, the
lender cannot recover the total value of her assets. There is then a role for the government:
social welfare can be improved using ﬁscal tools, but only in the loan sales scenario.
Therefore, the amount invested by the lender when she has new opportunities can be
increased when she sells part of her loans. The government intervention is useless when
the lender borrows from ﬁnanciers.
This paper is mainly related to the literature about asymmetric information in credit
markets, liquidity needs, and credit risk transfer (CRT). Concerning the ﬁrst group of
2papers, our results coincide with those of DeMarzo and Dufﬁe (1999). They present a
liquidity model with asymmetric information, and they ﬁnd that an optimal strategy for
the bank is to retain a portion of the loan in portfolio to diminish the information problem.
We have found the same result and we present a mechanism for banks to recover all the
value of their assets. Other paper with asymmetric information is Ambrose, LaCour-
Little and Sanders (2005). In that article the authors empirically examine whether banks
use the asymmetric information problem in their favor to sell riskier loans in the security
market. They ﬁnd that the securitized loans present lower ex-post default risk than the
ones retained in bank portfolios. According to them, securitization is a response to bank
capital regulations and reputation incentives. In our paper there is not a minimum of
capital required and then securitization is only used whith the objective of raising funds.
Concerning the literature about lenders’ liquidity needs there is a large number of
papers as Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Holmström and Tirole (1998), Diamond and Ra-
jan (2001 and 2005), Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2003), Rochet (2004) and Gorton and
Huang (2004). This paper is closely related to Diamond and Rajan (2001). They ana-
lyze the case of a lender who may face a liquidity need (for consumption or for a new
investment) when all of her assets are previously granted loans. They assume that loans
are illiquid, so the initial terms on the loan contract have to include a liquidity premium.
Giventhattheloan’svaluecannotbetotallyrecovered, thebanker maydemanda premium
to the entrepreneur and may incorporate contractual terms that allow her to liquidate the
entrepreneur’s project when she is in need of liquidity, thus there is a liquidation risk for
the entrepreneur.
Firms may be liquidated or denied funding because only a too small fraction of their
future returns can be paid to outsiders, as in Holmström and Tirole (1998). They show
that ex-post unproﬁtable wealth transfers to these ﬁrms can help them survive. While
individualsare assumed not being able to commit themselvesto make the state-contingent
payments, an intermediary can ex-ante hold collateral and thereby commit to make the
payments.
In Diamond and Rajan (2001) it is shown that the adverse consequences of illiquidity
could be avoided if the lender could borrowthe full value of the loan committingto deploy
her extractions skills. In their model, the lender may commit by borrowing using demand
deposits: a fragile capital structure that is subject to a “run”.
The notion of ﬁnancial assets illiquidity in Diamond and Rajan (2001) is completely
related to the speciﬁc skills a lender has to collect loan payments. They assume that it is
difﬁcultto make lenders commit to collect those paymentsonce they have sold their loans.
3This is a main difference with our model because we assume commitment is possible be-
cause securitization has been designed to minimize the loss of banker incentives to collect
payments. In our model the illiquidity of bank loans is due to asymmetric information
between lenders and liquidity providers.
Other paper closely related to ours is Gorton and Huang (2004). In that paper, the au-
thors present a model in which there are illiquid assets that are sold in a secondary market
where prices are endogenously determined. Private liquidity supply is socially beneﬁcial,
but it is also socially costly since liquidity suppliers could have made more efﬁcient in-
vestments ex-ante. As in Holmström and Tirole (1998), and also in our framework, there
is a role for the government to improve the social welfare. In the case of Gorton and
Huang (2004) the government subsidies distressed banks or ﬁrms, in Holmström and Ti-
role (1998) it plays the role of liquidity provider by issuing bonds. Again, the asymmetry
of information we are considering is the main difference of this paper with Gorton and
Huang (2004).
Concerning the recent literature about the use of credit risk transfer (CRT) instruments
by ﬁnancial entities, this paper is related to papers analyzing loan sales as Dufﬁe (2007)
and Cerasi and Rochet (2008). Notice that among CRT instruments we have loan trading,
credit derivatives, asset-backed securities and collaterized debt obligations. Bank loan
securitization is considered a CRT instrument when there is a true sale of the loan, so
there is CRT to the buyer of the loan.
Cerasi and Rochet (2008) present a model of prudential regulation where banks’ main
activity is monitoring loans. The authors analyze the implications of two cases: banks
suffering a negative solvency shock on loan returns, and banks having new lending op-
portunities. They show that banks liquidity needs can be solved using CRT instruments
as loan sales and credit derivatives. Since bank monitoring is non-observable, those CRT
instruments must be combined with optimal capital requirements to improve monitoring
incentives. The aim of their model is then to analyze the impact of CRT on the monitor-
ing function of banks and to derive implications for the optimal design of capital require-
ments.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a brief descriptionof
securitization transactions. We describe the model and the different possible negotiations
between the lender and the potential ﬁnanciers in the third and fourth sections. In the ﬁfth
section we present how the government can intervene to improve the social welfare. We
ﬁnalize, in the sixth section, with some concluding remarks.
42 A Brief Description of ABS Transactions
In a traditional transaction of a bank loan securitization there are at least ﬁve parties in-
volved: borrowers, loan brokers, originators (banks), buyers of assets, and investors in
the asset backed securities (ABS). The buyer is usually a Special Purpose Entity (SPE).
A SPE is established solely to purchase assets and to issue securities against them (e.g.











Figure 1: Simple scheme of participants in a bank loan securitization
In a securitization sale, the originator will often make the transfer to the buyer so that
it constitutes a "true sale", and the asset is removed from the originator’s balance sheet.
To guarantee on-time payments to security buyers, the SPE commonly uses a tranching
structure as well as guaranteed investment contracts, such as credit enhancements.
Securities receive a qualiﬁcation from CRAs depending on their structure, guarantees
and assets characteristics. Even if the quality of the assets in which securities are based on
is not very high, if the ABS has a credible and a high credit enhancement, the qualiﬁcation
will be high. Investors decisions are based mainly upon rating agencies reports.
In a tranching structure, cash ﬂows are split into classes with varying seniorities and
absolute priorities. The senior classes, or tranches, are typically rated AAA to A and they
have absolute priority in the cash ﬂows over the other classes rated B, C, D, according to
their subordination level. The classes absorbing all the initial risks are usually retained by
originators to correct possible moral hazard problems.
5The tranching structure spreads risks among diversiﬁed investors and matches risk
with investor risk tolerances. Some papers are concerned with the design of ABS. In
particular, Plantin (2003) presents a model in which a bank sells ABS to heterogeneous
ﬁnancial institutions under private information. The institutions differ in their abilities to
retail the securities and screen the collateral, that is to ﬁnd out the collateral quality. In
that context, the author shows that tranching arises as the optimal structure for securities
because it induces good screeners to specialize on junior tranches.
As a complement to the tranching structure, SPEs may arrange with a third party to
provide credit enhancement. A typical credit enhancement for securities is a credit line
guaranteed by a third party (another bank, an insurance company, an international agency,
a government institution). In case of default the guarantor is obliged to repay the security
buyers. Usually, securitized loans have good collateral but recovering their value can take
a long time: that is why a credible credit line is necessary.
In some ABS transactions government may play a key role. SPEs can have explicit or
implicit government backing (as the Government Sponsored Entities (GSEs) in the US)
to sell securities without the credit enhancements. Passmore, Sparks and Ingpen (2002)
study the transmission of the government subsidies to SPEs to the mortgage interest rates.
They have found that the interest rates of the mortgage loans securitized by a GSE are
usually lower than the interest rates of other loans, specially when GSEs behave compet-
itively. In the model presented in the next section, it will be shown that the government
can participate in securitization deals using ﬁscal tools to improve social welfare.
3 The Model
Let us introduce the general framework of the model and a brief discussion of the assump-
tions. We consider a model with three dates, similar to Diamond and Rajan (2001) and
Gorton and Huang (2004). There is a lender, that can be a representative bank, and poten-
tial ﬁnanciers henceforth simply referred to as investors. For simplicity all the agents are
risk neutral and they do not discount future cash ﬂows. There is a storage technology that
yields $1 per unit invested. We normalize the lender’s initial endowment to $1. At date 1
potential ﬁnanciers are endowed with large amounts of money.
At date 0, the lender invests in a loan technology that yields, per unit invested, a high
value H with probability π or a low value L with probability 1−π. The investment return
occurs at date 2, but information of its value arrives at date 1.
Assumption 1 πH +( 1− π)L ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ L ≤ 1.
6Assumption 1 means that the bank loan technology is on average proﬁtable, but risky.
Observe that this assumption implies that H must be strictly greater than 1.
Assumption 2 The return of the loan is observable and contractible. However, at date 1
the lender privately observes the realization of the loan return.
More precisely, at date 2 the realization H or L is observable, but at date 1 only the
bank knowsthe future return of the loan technology. Considering that lenders have special
skills to monitor borrowers, we can suppose they are the best informed about the value of
their loan assets.
Assumption 3 The loan investment cannot be liquidated before date 2.
Assumption 3, together with the asymmetric information structure described in as-
sumption 2, makes illiquid the lender investment at date 1. In Diamond and Rajan (2001)
we ﬁnd a similar assumption: the loans are illiquid before maturity due to speciﬁc skills
of the lender. The illiquidity of the lender’s assets is important in our framework because
she may face a high-valued investment opportunity at the interim stage.
Assumption 4 The lender may have access to a constant returns to scale technology that
yields R per unit invested. This occurs at date 1, and with probability θ. The return to this
new investment opportunity arrives at date 2 and it is not contractible.
Assumption 5 R>1 >θ R .
Assumptions 4 and 5 mean that the new investment opportunity is riskless and prof-
itable. The lender’s best choice, however, is always to invest her endowment of $1 in the
loan technology. Observe that whether there is a new investment opportunity at date 1 is
independent of the loan investment technology.
Our objective is to ﬁnd mechanisms that allow the lender to raise the maximum level
of funds when she has a new investment opportunity and all her assets are illiquid. In the
next section we analyze two different possibilities for raising money: sell the loan, that
is to securitize; or borrow from investors. To summarize the framework of the model we
present in Figure 2 the sequence of events.
4 The Market for Liquidity
Henceforth we concentrate in the case in which the lender has a new investment opportu-























Figure 2: Time line
that new investment. Recall that, to make the model interesting, we include an illiquidity
problem. Indeed, banks are sometimes faced to new and good investment opportunities
but all their resources are already invested. We suppose, as in Diamond and Rajan (2001),
that the lender cannot ﬁnd liquidity by borrowing against the realization of her new in-
vestment opportunity. If that were possible, there would be no liquidity problem. That
idea is included in assumption 4.
At date 1 the lender can obtain liquidity in two ways: by selling her loan investment
through securitization, or by borrowing.
Assumption 6 Unsecured credit is not available to the lender, that means she cannot
borrow without pledging collateral.
Assumption 6 implies the lender, whether obtaining funds by securitization or by bor-
rowing, has to use her loan asset. Moreover, by assumption 3, the loan cannot be liqui-
dated at date 1. Besides, there is an asymmetric information problem: at date 1 only the
lender has information about the future return of her loan investment.
Without the asymmetry of information, the maximum amount of funds the lender may
get is limited by the return of the loan, that is H or L. When the investors have the
bargaining power in the negotiation with the lender, they absorb the gains of the new
investment. In that case the amount raised by the lender may be H/R or L/R, depending
on the future return of the loan.
When the information is not public the lender informs the investors about the value of
her loan through a message m, where m is equal to H or L. When the message is equal to
L investors believe it, but when it is equal to H investors may be skeptical of its validity
because the lender may be lying to raise the maximum amount of money. The asymmetry
of information may then generate an inefﬁciency to the lender when having a loan with
8a high return as it will be shown. We next analyze and compare the two alternatives the
lender has to raise funds.
4.1 Credit Market
In Diamond and Rajan (2001) a lender may have a liquidity shock and there are numerous
potential ﬁnanciers, each with a small endowment. They ﬁnd that the best way lenders
havetoraise fundsisbyissuingdeposits. Inthissubsectionwe assumepotentialﬁnanciers
can be represented by an investor who establishes the terms of the credit he grants to the
lender. As a consequence, the investor absorbs the gains of the new technology leaving
the lender with the minimum needed such that she is interested in the credit. To avoid
confusions, in this part of the analysis we will refer to the lender as the bank.
By assumption 6 the bank has to propose a collateral to the investor when borrowing.
Despite the bank is the only one to have information about the future loan return, it has to
use it as collateral.
The negotiation between the investor and the bank is the following:
• The investor proposes the terms of the credit.
• The bank accepts or not those terms.
• If the bank accepts, it informs about the future return of the loan sending a message
m to the investor, where m is equal to H or L.
If the bank does not accept, it does not invest in the new technology and it receives
the loan return at date 2. This is the status quo scenario.
• The bank receives from the investor an amount of money previously established in
the terms of the credit. That amount depends on the message m.
• At date 2 the bank repays the credit, otherwise the investor seizes the loan return.
We assume the investor is unable to perform any kind of screening, so the best he can
do is specify the terms of the credit such that the bank send the true message. We call Im
the amount the investor lends to the bank, and Fm the face value of the credit. The terms
of the credit specify the values of Im and Fm for each possible value of m.
The bank accepts the credit terms if the payoff at date 2 of investing in the new op-
portunity by borrowing is higher than the status quo (i.e. doing nothing). The following
inequality represents the participation constraint of the bank when the loan return is H or
L.
ImR +[ k − Fm]+ ≥ k for k = H,L (1)
9In (1), ImR isthe returnof thenewinvestmentopportunity,[k−Fm]+
1 isthe remainder
payoff of the loan investment after paying back the credit to the investor. Recall the loan
investment is the collateral to this credit, therefore if the face value Fm is higher than the
loan return, the investor gets only the return of the loan.
The investor speciﬁes the terms of the credit forcing the bank to send a true message.
For that, the following incentive constraint must be satisﬁed,
k =a r gm a x
m∈H,L
{ImR +[ k − Fm]+} for k = H,L (2)




π(FH − IH)+( 1− π)(FL − IL) (3)
subject to (1), (2) and Fm ≤ m for m = H,L
The objective function of the problem (P1) represents the investor’s expected return.
Restrictions (1) and (2) are the participation and incentive constraint of the bank. The last
restriction insures that the face value of the credit is limited by the loan investment return.
The following proposition describes the terms of the credit that are the solution of the
problem (P1).
Proposition 1 At date 1, the investor proposes a credit to the bank such that no matter
the message m sent by the bank, the amount lent is L/R and the corresponding face value
is L. In other words, the terms of the contract are IH = IL = L/R and FH = FL = L.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The investor lends to the bank the same level of liquidity no matter the quality of the
bank loan. In turn, the face value is also the same across loan’s qualities. The investor
extracts the full payoff of the new investment opportunity, this implies his credit has a
gross return of R per unit lent. As a consequence, the proﬁt of the bank does not change
when it has access to a new investment and, therefore, the bank is indifferent between
raising funds at date 1 or not. We could suppose that, if indifferent, the bank would
choose to borrow. Indeed, banks are always interested on investing in non-risky projects,
even when they do not get monetary beneﬁts, because they can keep clients or they can
attract new ones.
1[x]+ is equal to x if x ≥ 0, otherwise it is equal to zero.
10Notice that the credit terms are independent of the probability π. This is because at
date 1 the bank knows the future return of its loan and the investor designs the credit such
that the bank reveals the information it has about its loan. Besides, the credit terms are
such that the investor does not lose money in any case. Then the face values FH and FL
are limited to the lowest return of the date 0 loan, that is L.
4.2 Secondary Market
In the secondary market, the lender ﬁnds liquidity by selling a part of her loan investment,
that is by issuing securities based on her loan. Recall there is an information problem:
at date 1 only the lender knows the future return of her loan. Moreover, we assume that
screening by the investors is not possible so the negotiation between the lender and the
investors should be based on a message m sent by the lender. The message informs the
investors about the loan return, m is equal to H or L.
When the lender sells a part of her loan, the transfer of the loan to the investors has a
unit cost of γ. Therefore, the total cost of transferring a fraction q is qγ. Who pays that
cost does not change our results, thus we suppose it is paid by the security buyers (i.e. the
investors).
Assumption 7 γ ≤ γm ≡ (1 − 1
R)L.
This assumption can be rewritten as R(L − γ) ≥ L. It means that it is good for the
lender to sell her low-return loan even taking into account the cost of the assets’ transfer.
Because L is lower than 1 then γ is also lower than 1.
In what follows, we analyze two possibleways to issuesecurities. First, we present the
case in which the lender directly issues the securities. Second, we consider the case when
the lender sells her loan to an Special Purpose Entity which in turn issues the securities.
The bank issues the securities
When investors are many potential ﬁnanciers with small endowments, the lender pro-
poses the portion of the loan she wants to sell and its corresponding price. Let us call qm,
with qm ∈ [0,1], the fraction of the loan sold by the lender and pm its corresponding price.
The lender then proposes a value for qm and for the price pm for m equal to H and L.
When the bank sends the true message, the investors receive qmm at date 2. When
the message is not equal to the future return of the loan, the investors receive qHL or
qLH, depending if the message was H or L. We are interested in a truthful revelation
mechanism, i.e. m is indeed equal to the future return of the loan.
11When buying part of the loan, investors should get at date 2 at least the price they have
paid plus the cost of transferring the assets. Because investors buy a portion qm of the
loan, at date 2 they get qmm if the message was true. The following inequality represents
the participation constraint of the investors for each possible return of the loan.
qkk ≥ pk + γqk for k = H,L (4)
On the same way, the lender is willing to sell part of her loan if this is proﬁtable. The
following inequality is the participation constraint of the lender.
pkR +( 1− qk)k ≥ k for k = H,L (5)
In (5), pkR is the return of the new investment and (1 − qk)k is the return of the part
of the loan the lender has retained in her portfolio.
If the lender has a high return loan, she has no interest on lying about the quality of her
loan. Besides, if she lies, the investor’s payoff will not be negatively affected. However, if
the loan return is low, the lender has interest on lying. To avoid that, the investors believe
the message sent by the lender if and only if both pi and qi (i = H,L) satisfy the following
lender’s incentive compatibility constraint.
L =a r g m a x
m=H,L
{pmR +( 1− qm)L} (6)
The lender solves the following problem (P2) in order to ﬁnd the portion of the loan
to be sold and its corresponding price.
(P2)m a x
qk,pk
[pkR +( 1− qk)k] (7)
subject to (4), (5), (6) and qk ∈ [0,1] for k = H,L
In problem (P2), the lender maximizes her proﬁt (7) subject to the participation con-
straints(4) and(5) of theinvestorsand the bank for each possibleloanreturn; the incentive
compatibility constraint (6); and the restriction for qk.
Without the asymmetry of information, the lender would completely sell her loan
(qk =1 ) at a price pk = k where k is the future return of the loan. Replacing these
values of q and p in problem (P2), we see the lender’s incentive compatible constraint is
not satisﬁed when the return of the loan is low, that is k = L. In that case the lender has
incentives to lie and she sends a message m equal to H. The next proposition presents the
prices and portions of loan to sell such that the lender has no interest to lie.
12Proposition 2 When the lender sells part of her loan in a secondary market, she sells a
portion qk of it at a price pk where k is the future return of the loan. We have,
qH =
RL − Rγ − L
RH − Rγ − L
pH =( H − γ)qH (8)
qL =1 pL =( L − γ) (9)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice that the portions and the prices of proposition 2 are independent of the prob-
ability π. This is because the participation constraints of the lender and the investors are










Figure 3: Funds raised by the lender when selling part of her loan
In Figure 3 we represent the prices and the cost of the transaction. We observe that
when having high quality loans the lender invests less in the new opportunity compared
to the case when she has low quality loans. It sounds paradoxical, but banks with L loans
can raise more funds than banks with H loans. In compensation, when having a loan with
high return the lender keeps a fraction of it. In contrast, when the loan is L the lender sells
all of it without keeping a fraction of it. This can be interpreted as a signal sent by the
lender to the investors when the loan return is high.
Corollary 1 When the lender sells part of her loan in a secondary market, the unit price
for the high return loan is equal to pH/qH = H−γ, and for the low return loan it is equal
to pL/qL = L − γ.
13With a low return loan the lender can raise more funds than with a high return loan.
However, according to corollary 1, the unit price of a loan with high payoff is higher than
for a loan with low return. The lender sells her loan at the unit price she would sell it if the
information about its return were public. Therefore, the asymmetric information problem
affects the amount the lender can obtain but not the unit price.
Up tothispoint,we have analyzed theperformance of twoalternativesto raise fundsin
terms of the amount of money they may collect. Let us compare them now. When having
a loan with low return it is better for the bank to go to the secondary market. However,
when the loan quality is high, the lender’s decision will depend on the cost γ. For small
values of γ she gets more in the secondary market, but for high values of γ she gets more
in the credit market. Recall Figure 3 and recall that the bank always raise L/R in the
credit market.
A Special Purpose Entity (SPE) issues the securities
We analyze now another case we can have when the lender sells her loan in a sec-
ondary market. In this subsection we assume that potential ﬁnanciers can be represented
by an investor. The investor buys the loan, or part of it, to issue securities. The investor
plays then the role of a SPE (see section 2). Notice that the SPE can be a sort of branch
of the bank, or that the bank is shareholder of the SPE. Those cases were analyzed previ-
ously in this subsection and now we focus on the case in which the bank and the SPE are
independent.
The investordecides the termsof the negotiation,despite the lender has an information
advantage. As before, we call qm, with qm ∈ [0,1], the portion of the loan sold by the
lender and pm its corresponding price. The investor proposes a portion qm and a price pm
for m equal to H and to L.
Recall that when the lender sends the true message, the investor receives qmm at date
2. Otherwise the investor receives qHL or qLH, depending if the message was H or L.
The investor decides to buy a part of the loan if it is proﬁtable for him. We present next
the investor’s participation constraint, which is just equation (4).
qkk ≥ pk + γqk for k = H,L (10)
In the same way, the lender decides to sell part of her loan whenever this is proﬁtable.
We have the same lender’s participation constraint as before, that is,
pkR +( 1− qk)k ≥ k for k = H,L (11)
14The investor wants the lender to say the truth about the future return of the loan. For
that, the following incentive compatibility constraint must be satisﬁed at the optimum.
Notice that we need only one incentive compatibility constraint, as in problem (P2).
L =a r g m a x
m=H,L
{pmR +( 1− qm)L} (12)
To ﬁnd the portion of the loan to buy and its corresponding price, the investor solves
the following problem (P3).
(P3)m a x
qH,pH,qL,pL
π[qHH − pH − γqH]+( 1− π)[qLL − pL − γqL] (13)
subject to (10), (11), (12) and qk ∈ [0,1] for k = H,L
In problem (P3), the investor maximizes his expected proﬁt (13) subject to the partic-
ipation constraints of the investors (10) and the lender (11); the incentive compatibility
constraint (12); and the restrictions for qH and qL.
Problems (P2) and (P3) only differ in the objective function. The following proposi-
tion presents the solution of problem (P3).
Proposition 3 When the investor buys part of the lender’s loan, he buys a portion qk of
the loan at a price pk where k is the future return of the loan. We have qL =1and,
(i) if π(RH − Rγ − L) <H− L then qH = pH =0and pL = L/R;
(ii) ifπ(RH−Rγ−L) ≥ H−L and R(L−γ) ≥ H then qH =1and pH = pL = H/R.





R(H−L) and pL = L − γ;
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice that the prices we have found in this Proposition 3 depend on the probability
π, whereas this was not the case in Propositions 1 and 2. Recall that π is the probability
that the loan has a high return at date 2. The return of the investor depends on π, that is
why ﬁnal prices depend on the probability π.
Let us brieﬂy discuss Proposition 3. We observe that when the lender has a low return
loan, she sells it partially or entirely to raise funds. In contrast, this is not the case when
having a high return loan. More precisely, for low values of π, the investor proposes to
buy part of the loan but only if the loan return is low. In that case, the lender raises the
15same amount of money than in the credit market, and the investor absorbs the proﬁtability
of the new technology because he pays L/R at date 1 and he receives L at date 2.
When π is high (i.e. the probability of having a high return loan is high) there are two
cases depending on whether R(L−γ) is higher or lower than H.I fw eh a v eR(L−γ) ≥
H, it is proﬁtable for the lender to sell her loan at L − γ in order to invest in the new
technology. This holdseven when the loan return is high. Therefore, the investorproposes
to buy all the loan, no matter its payoff. The price of the loan is equal to H/R, so in that
case the lender is raising more funds for the new investment than what she could have
obtained in the credit market.
In turn, when R(L − γ) <H , it is not proﬁtable for the lender to sell the high return
loan at a low price. Therefore, the investor proposes to buy the entire loan if the return
is low, but just a part of it if the return is high. When the loan return is low the lender
invests in the new opportunity L − γ when raising funds in the secondary market, which
by assumption 7 is higher than what she can get in the credit market, that is L/R. When
the loan return is high, we need to analyze different values for the cost γ to ﬁnd which
market provides more funds to the lender. This is done below.
Figure 4 presents the results of Proposition 3 for different combinations of γ and π,

























pL = L − γ
qH = pH =0
pL = L
R
Figure 4: Terms of the loan sale when RL ≥ H
Notice that when the probability of having a high loan return is high and the cost γ is
small, the lender raises H/R no matter the future return of the loan. However, for other
values of γ, the lender raises less funds when having a loan with low return, than when
16having a loan with high return. Then, as in the previous case we have analyzed, it may
sound paradoxical but having a high loan return actually diminishes the capacity of the
lender to raise funds for new investments. Besides, the lender keeps a part of her high
return loan except when the probability π is very high. As it was mentioned before, this
can be interpreted as a signal sent to the investor to inform the loan return is high.
Corollary 2 When π(RH − Rγ − L) ≥ H − L, the investor proposes to buy part of the
high return loan at a unit price equal to pH/qH = H/R and to buy the low return loan at







L − γ if L − γ<H / R
H/R if L − γ ≥ H/R
Corollary 2 shows that when it is proﬁtable for the lender to sell part of her high return
loan, then its price per unit is always higher or equal than the price per unit of a low return
loan. This result is similar to the result of Corollary 1. Besides, in the case of the credit
market we ﬁnd something similar too. Recall in the credit market the bank receives L/R
at date 1 and has to pay L at date 2. When the loan return is high, this is equivalent to sell
a fraction L/H of the loan at a price L/R, thus the unit price is H/R. In the credit market
the price per unit of a low return loan is L/R.
Finally, Figure 5 shows the prices of cases (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3. For those

















Figure 5: Prices when π(RH − Rγ − L) ≥ H − L
In Figure 5 it is clearly shown that when having a low return loan, the lender prefers
to raise funds in the secondary market rather than in the credit market. Recall the lender
raises L/R in the credit market. The lender also prefers the secondary market when her
17loan return is high, but only if the cost γ is low, otherwise the lender can raise more funds
in the credit market.
It is important to highlight the following: a lender with a low return loan raises at least
the same amount of money that a lender with a high return loan may obtain, no matter
the liquidity market. Therefore, a lender with a high return loan does not invest at date 1
as much as the value of her loan. In the next section we present how the government can
participate in the secondary market to improve the date 1 investment of a lender having a
high return loan.
5 Government Participation
In the previous section we have studied the terms of the negotiation between the lender
and potential ﬁnanciers in the credit market, as well as in the secondary market. We
have shown that no matter the loan return, the lender cannot raise more than L in any
of the markets. Moreover, when the lender has a low return loan she can always raise
more liquidity than when she has a high return loan. Therefore, the lender invests low
amounts of money when she has new opportunities, even when having valuable assets.
Those results are consequences of the asymmetry of information between the lender and
the investors. In this section we present a mechanism to increase the amount of funds the
bank can raise at date 1.
To correct the asymmetric information problem, we propose the government partici-
pates in the liquidity market by taxing the lender when she has a new investment oppor-
tunity. The tax has to be paid by the lender at date 2 and it depends on the loan return she
reports. The tax can play the role of signal to investors: when the loan return is high, the
lender can commit to pay a tax at date 2.
We call tm the tax imposed by the government. Recall m is the loan return reported
by the bank at date 1. Observe that tm can be positive or negative. When it is positive it
is a tax and when it is negative it is a subsidy. Then, at date 2 the government taxes or
subsidies the lender, depending on the message she has sent.
By introducing the payments tm we modify the incentive compatibility constraints of
the lender. This will allow her to increase the amount of funds she can raise. Let us
ﬁrst analyze how results are modiﬁed when the lender sells her loan in the secondary
market and the government intervenes. We focus in the case in which the bank issues the
securities based on its loan.
When tk is a tax that have to be paid by the bank at date 2, it must be the case that
18the lender has enough money to pay it. This is the case if the following limited liability
condition is satisﬁed.
R(k − γ) ≥ tk for k = H,L (14)
Besides, the values of tH and tL should be such that at date 0 the bank prefers to invest
in the loan technology rather than the status quo. For that, the following participation
constraint of the bank should be veriﬁed.
θ{π[R(H − γ) − tH]+( 1−π)[R(L − γ) −tL]} +( 1− θ){πH +( 1− π)L}≥1 (15)
If the governmentimposestransfers tH and tL that verify (14) and (15), then the lender
solves the following problem (P4),
(P4)m a x
qk,pk
[pkR +( 1− qk)k − tk] (16)
subject to qkk ≥ pk + γqk (17)
pkR +( 1− qk)k − tk ≥ k − tk (18)
k =a r g m a x
m∈{H,L}
{pmR +( 1− qm)k − tm} (19)
0 ≤ qk ≤ 1 for k = H,L (20)
In problem (P4) the lender chooses the fraction of loan to sell in the secondary market
(qk), and its price (pk) so as to maximize her date 2 payoff subject to the participation
constraint of the investor (17), to her participation constraint (18), to the incentive com-
patibility constraints (19) that insure she is not lying about her loan return, and to the
conditions for qk. Notice that the problem (P4) differs from problem (P2) only in the
transfers tH and tL. We present next the solution of the lender’s problem.
Proposition 4 When the bank issues securities, and the conditions (14) and (15) are ver-
iﬁed, as well as the following conditions:
R(H − L) ≥ tH − tL and (21)
(RL − Rγ − L)+tH − tL > 0, (22)
the bank chooses qL =1 , pL = L − γ, pH = qH(H − γ) and
qH =
(RL − Rγ − L)+tH − tL
RH − Rγ − L
(23)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Some important results arise from this Proposition, let us present them.
19Corollary 3 The lender sells all her loan regardless its return, that is qH = qL =1 , when
tH − tL = R(H − L).
Corollary 4 Taxing the lender improves the date 1 investment if tH ≥ tL.
Corollary 3 and Corollary 4 are obtained by comparing the results of Proposition 2
and Proposition 4. If it is to improve the date 1 investment, the government will ﬁnd
convenient to choose tL equal to 0 and tH positive. Indeed, the lender would pay a tax
only when her loan return is high, and she would never receive a subsidy.
In Figure 6 we show the conditions that tH and tL must verify in order to increase the
















Figure 6: Values of tH and tL that improves the date 1 investment
The intersection of the gray and the striped regions represents the combinations of tH
and tL that improve the amount of money obtained by the lender at date 1. Notice that
the participation constraint of the lender (15), represented in blue, moves clockwise as π
increases.
Figure 6 showsit is always possiblethatthe governmentimprovesthe amountinvested
at date 1 choosing tL =0 , that is without taxing or subsidizing the bank when the loan
return is low. This case is represented by the red line. Observe that tL equal to zero
implies that tH should be positive. We have then the following result.
Corollary 5 Whentheloanreturnishigh,thegovernmentcanalwaysimprovetheamount
of money invested at date 1 by taxing the lender. This holds in the case the lender sells
her loan in the secondary market.
20Recall that, without government intervention, the lender informs investors in the sec-
ondary market that the loan return is high by retaining a fraction of the loan in her portfo-
lio. With the government participation, in turn, the lender can accept to pay a tax at date 2
instead of keeping part of her loan. In contrast, when the bank borrows from the investors,
this is useless.
In the credit market the bank can never get more than L. This is because the corre-
sponding face value of the credit must be lower than the minimum return of the date 0
loan. Recall the incentive compatibility constraint (2) of the bank when borrowing in the
credit market. The bank’s incentive compatibility constraints, now including tH and tL
are,
IHR − FH − tH ≥ ILR − FL − tL (24)
ILR + L − FL − tL ≥ IHR +[ L − FH]+ − tH (25)
Therefore, we deduce that FH must be lower than L because the previous constraints
imply L − FH ≥ [L − FH]+ ≥ 0. The investor lends to the bank only if Fk ≥ Ik for
k = H,L, so the amount lent by the investor when the loan return is high, that is IH, has
to be lower than L. Thus the participation of the governmentdoes not increase the amount
borrowed by the bank at date 1.
Finally, the government may be interested on participating in the secondary market,
helpingthe bank when the new investmentis sociallyuseful. Otherwise, there is no reason
why the government should participate. Observe that the bank can commit to pay tH at
date 2 to an institution different from the government, but the commitment may not be
credible.
6 Concluding Remarks
Loans are illiquid assets that cannot be easily negotiated or transferred. The development
of secondary markets have made loan sales possible preserving the role of lenders as
collectors of loan payments. Loan sales in secondary markets is a mechanism used by
lenders, as banks, to raise funds for new investments. However, when loan buyers do
not have a screening capacity to discover the value of the lender assets, the loans cannot
be sold at their value. Lenders are the best informed agents about the real value of their
assets, and it is difﬁcult to credibly report those values to loan buyers. As long as there is
a possibilityfor the lender to lie about the loan value, investors do not pay a high value for
the loans. As a response, lenders retain in their portfolio part of their high valued loans.
21Therefore, it is not always possible for lenders to raise an amount of money equal to the
value of their assets.
In the context of this paper, loans are illiquid mainly due to the asymmetry of in-
formation about their value. Another source of the bank illiquidity in our model is the
impossibilityof the bank to use the new investment to raise funds. Recall the return of the
new investment is not contractible. What we have in mind in this situation is that ﬁnan-
cial entities as banks have always interest on having available funds for new investments.
This is particularly relevant when the banking sector is very competitive, so a bank having
available funds can be the winner in a race for a new investment.
To correct the illiquidity of high valued loans, we propose that the government par-
ticipates taxing the bank when it has a new investment opportunity. We have shown that
the tax is a mechanism that allow the lender to credibly announce the value of her loan to
create the liquidity. The lender can sell her loan at its value in the secondary market, even
when its value is high and this is privately known by the lender. Government participation
improves the amount of money raised by the bank because it has the power to commit the
bank to behave, even when the new investment return is not contractible.
An important contribution of this paper is that we present a mechanism for the bank
to credibly reveal the value of its assets without the participation of a credit rating agency.
In the same way, we show how the government can participate to make the secondary
market more efﬁcient without subsidizing banks and without given credit enhancement to
the security issuer.
Our simple model can be enriched by doing some comparative statics to analyze how
the negotiation terms change with the parameters. In the same way, we can improve the
model including monitoring of borrowers by lenders. Due to the moral hazard, the lender
may have to retain part of her loan to be forced to exert monitoring effort.
Finally, liquidity is not scarce in our framework. It is assumed that there are potential
ﬁnanciers endowed with high levels of money. It can be interesting to change that as-
sumption and to analyze a more competitive liquidity market including other investment
opportunities to the ﬁnanciers, as to invest in government bonds. Therefore, the price of
the loans will be affected by the price of the government bonds.
References
[1] Ambrose, B., M. LaCour-Little and A. Sanders, Does Regulatory Capital Arbitrage
or Asymmetric Information Drive Securitization?. Working Paper, 2003.
22[2] Besanko D., Kanatas G., Credit Market Equilibrium with Bank Monitoring and
Moral Hazard. The Review of Financial Studies, 1993 Volume 6, number 1, pp.
213-232.
[3] Bolton, P. and X. Freixas, Equity, Bonds, and Bank Debt: Capital Structure and
Financial Market Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information. Journal of Political
Economy, 2000, vol. 108, no. 2.
[4] Cerasi, V. and J-C. Rochet, Solvency Regulation and Credit Risk Transfer. Paolo
Bafﬁ Centre Research Paper No. 2008-21.
[5] DeMarzo, P. and D. Dufﬁe, A Liquidity-Based Model of Security Design. Economet-
rica, Vol. 67, No 1 (Jan., 1999), 65-99.
[6] Diamond, D., Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 1984, 51, 393-414.
[7] Diamond, D., Monitoring and Reputation: The choice between Bank Loans and
Directly Placed Debt. Journal of Political Economy, 1991, vol. 99(4), p. 689-721.
[8] Diamond, D. and Rajan R., Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial
Fragility: A Theory of Banking. Journal of Political Economy, 2001, Vol. 109, No.
2., pp. 287-327.
[9] Diamond, D. and Rajan R., Liquidity Shortages and Banking Crises. The Journal of
Finance, Vol. LX, No. 2., April 2005.
[10] Dufﬁe, D., Innovations in Credit Risk Transfer: Implications for Financial Stability.
BIS Working Paper No. 255.
[11] Freixas, X., B. Parigi and J-C. Rochet, The Lender of Last Resort: A 21st Century
Approach. Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 2, n. 6, December
2004, p. 1085-1115.
[12] Gorton, G. and N. Souleles, Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization. Working
Paper, April 2005.
[13] Gorton, G. and Huang L., Liquidity, Efﬁciency, and Bank Bailouts. The American
Economic Review, 2004, Vol. 94, No. 3. (June), pp. 455-483.
[14] Greenbaum, S. and A. Thakor, Bank Funding modes - Securitization versus De-
posits. Journal of Banking and Finance, 1987, 11, 379-401, North-Holland.
23[15] Han, L. and G. Lai, An analysis of securitization in the insurance industry. The
Journal of Risk Insurance, 1995 Vol. 62, No 2, 286-296.
[16] Holmstrom B. and Tirole J., Private and Public Supply of Liquidity. Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 1998, Vol. 106(1), pages 1-40, February.
[17] Plantin, G., Tranching. Discussion paper, 449. Financial Markets Group, London
School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK, 2003.
[18] Passmore, W., R. Sparks, and J. Ingpen, GSEs, Mortgage Rates and Mortgage Secu-
ritization. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2002, 25, 215-242.
[19] Repullo, R., Who should act as LOLR? An incomplete contracts model. Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 32, No. 3, Part 2: What Should Central Banks do?
Aug 2000, 580-605.
[20] Rochet J-C. and X. Vives, Coordination Failure and the Lender of Last Resort: Was
Bagehot Right After All?. Working Paper, 2003.
[21] Rochet J-C., Macroeconomic Shocks and Banking Supervision. Journal of Financial
Stability, 2004, 1(1), 93-110.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The problem (P1) is equivalent to the following problem:
max
IH,FH,IL,FL
π(FH − IH)+( 1− π)(FL − IL) (26)
s.t. IHR ≥ FH (27)
ILR + L − FL ≥ IHR +[ L − FH]+ (28)
FH ≤ H (29)
FL ≤ L (30)
With the Kuhn-Tucker conditions it is easy to check that the constraint (28) should be
binding. As a consequence (27) and (30) should be binding too, then F ∗




LR = F ∗
H +[ L − FH]+. Analyzing the cases for [L − FH]+, we obtain that the
optimum is achieved when F ∗
H = L and I∗
H = I∗
L = L/R.    
Proof of Proposition 2.
24It is easy to show that when the loan return is L, the price pL = L − γ and qL =1 .




pHR − qHH (31)
s.t. qH(H − γ) ≥ pH (μ1) (32)
R(L − γ) ≥ pHR +( 1− qH)L (μ2) (33)
0 ≤ qH ≤ 1( μ3)(μ4) (34)
The restriction(32) represents the investorsparticipationconstraint,(33)represents the
incentive compatibility constraint that insures the lender with low return loan is not lying.
We call μi with i =1 ,...,4 the Kuhn-Tucker positive multipliers. Following we present
some of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions that have to be satisﬁed at the optimum:
R =μ1 + μ2R (35)
−H = − μ1(H − γ) − μ2L − μ3 + μ4 (36)
We analyze three cases: q∗




H =1 , then μ3 =0 . μ1  =0because when μ1 =0we have μ2 =1and
μ4 = −(H −L).S op∗
H = H −γ, but the constraint (33) is not veriﬁed. Therefore,
at the optimum q∗
H  =1 .
• If q∗
H =0 , then μ4 =0 , p∗
H =0and μ2 =0 , μ1 = R and μ3 = −(RH − Rγ − H),
then at the optimum q∗
H  =0 .
• If q∗
H ∈ (0,1), then μ3 = μ4 =0 , μ2 =( RH − Rγ − H)/(RH − Rγ − L) and
μ1 = R(H − L)/(RH − Rγ − L). Observe that μ1  =0and μ2  =0then (32) and




RL − Rγ − L




(RL − Rγ − L)(H − γ)
RH − Rγ − L
(37)
By assumption 7 the solution q∗
H is positive and lower than 1.    
Proof of Proposition 3
25The problem (P3) is equivalent to the following problem:
max
qH,pH,qL,pL
π[qH(H − γ) − pH]+( 1− π)[qL(L − γ) − pL] (38)
qH(H − γ) ≥ pH (η1) (39)
qL(L − γ) ≥ pL (η2) (40)
pHR ≥ qHH (η3) (41)
pLR − qLL ≥ pHR − qHL (η4) (42)
0 ≤ qH ≤ 1( η5)(η6) (43)
0 ≤ qL ≤ 1( η7)(η8) (44)
The restriction (39) and (40) represent the investor participation constraint for possi-
ble loan return, (41) is the lender’s participation constraint when the loan return is high.
(42) represents the incentive compatibility constraint that insures the lender with low re-
turn loan is not lying. We call ηi with i =1 ,...,8 the Kuhn-Tucker positive multipliers.
Following we present some of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions that have to be satisﬁed at the
optimum:
π(H − γ)=− η1(H − γ)+η3H − η4L − η5 + η6 (45)
−π =η1 − η3R + η4R (46)
(1 − π)(L − γ)=− η2(L − γ)+η4L − η7 + η8 (47)
−(1 − π)= η2 − η4R (48)
By (46) and (48) we deduce η3 and η4 are different from zero. Including (48) in (47)
we obtain η8 = η4(RL − Rγ − L)+η7, then η8 is also different from zero. Therefore,
restrictions (41) and (42) are binding and q∗





H(H − L)+L and η7 =0 .
Following we analyze three possible cases for q∗
H: q∗




H =0 , then p∗
H =0 , p∗
L = L/R and η2 = η6 =0 . All the constraints of the
problem are veriﬁed, now we have to ﬁnd the necessary conditions to ensure that
all the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers are positive. We easily obtain η4R =( 1− π), then
η8 > 0 and η3R = η1 +1 . Replacing in (45) we obtain
η5R =( H − L) − π(RH − Rγ − L) − η1(RH − Rγ − H) (49)
We can choose η1 =0 , but to have η5 ≥ 0 and then q∗
H =0we need to have
H − L ≥ π(RH − Rγ − L).
26• If q∗
H =1 , then p∗
H = p∗
L = H/R and η1 = η2 = η5 =0 . To be sure that (40)
is veriﬁed at the optimum, we need R(L − γ) ≥ H. With that condition we are
sure that all the constraints of the problem are veriﬁed. Now we have to ensure
that all the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers are positive. As in the previous case, we easily
obtain η4R =( 1− π), then η8 > 0 and η3R =1 . Replacing in (45) we obtain
η6R = π(RH − Rγ − L) − (H − L).
Then to have q∗ =1as a solution, we need to have π(RH − Rγ − L) ≥ H − L
and R(L − γ) ≥ H.
• If q∗
H ∈ (0,1), then η1 = η5 = η6 =0 . Replacing those values in the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions (45), (46) and (48) we obtain η3R = η4R + π,
η4R(H − L)=π(RH − Rγ − H) (50)
η2(H − L)= π(RH − Rγ − L) − (H − L) (51)
To have η2 positive we need π(RH − Rγ − L) ≥ H − L. Then the constraint (40)
is binding and we have q∗




L = L − γ. To insure that q∗
H ∈ (0,1) we need R(L − γ) ≤ H.    
Proof of Proposition 4.
We ﬁrst ﬁnd the solution of (P4) taking into the taxes tH, with tL. It is easy to show
that for when the loan return is L, the price pL = L − γ and qL =1 . Taking into account
this, the problem (P4) for k = H is equivalent to the following problem:
max
qH,tH
pHR − qHH (52)
s.t. qH(H − γ) ≥ pH (ρ1) (53)
R(L − γ) − tL ≥ pHR +( 1− qH)L − tH (ρ2) (54)
pHR +( 1− qH)H − tH ≥ R(L − γ) − tL (ρ3) (55)
0 ≤ qH ≤ 1( ρ4)(ρ5) (56)
The restrictions(53) represents the investorsparticipationconstraint,(54)and (55) rep-
resents the incentive compatibility constraints that insures the lender is not lying. We call
ρi with i =1 ,...,5 the Kuhn-Tucker positive multipliers. Following we present some of
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions that have to be satisﬁed at the optimum:
R =ρ1 + ρ2R − ρ3R (57)
−H = − ρ1(H − γ) − ρ2L + ρ3H − ρ4 + ρ5 (58)
27We analyze three cases: q∗




H =1 , then ρ4 =0 . ρ1  =0because when ρ1 =0we have ρ3 = ρ2 − 1 and
μ5 = −(H − L)ρ2 which is impossible. So p∗
H = H − γ, and we need
tH − tL = R(H − L) (59)
• If q∗
H =0 , then ρ5 =0 .W eh a v eρ1  =0or ρ2  =0 .
If ρ1  =0then p∗
H =0 , ρ2 = ρ3 =0 , ρ1 = R and ρ4 = −(RH − Rγ − H), so this
case is not possible.
If ρ2  =0then ρ3 =0and p∗
HR =( RL − Rγ − L)+tH − tL, ρ1 =0 , ρ2 =1 ,
ρ4 = H − L and we need to have 0 ≥ (RL− Rγ −L)+tH − tL. Observe that p∗
H
is negative in this case, which has no sense except if tL − tH =( RL − Rγ − L).
• If q∗
H ∈ (0,1), then ρ4 = ρ5 =0 . We have that ρ1  =0and ρ2  =0because
ρ2R(H − L)= ρ1(RH − Rγ − H) (60)
ρ3R(H − L)= ρ1(RH − Rγ − L) − R(H − L) (61)
Therefore, constraints (53) and (54) are saturated, so
q
∗
H(RH − Rγ − L)=( RL − Rγ − L)+tH − tL (62)
p
∗
H = qH(H − γ) (63)
We need R(H − L) >t H − tL to be sure that the constraint (55) is veriﬁed and to
have 1 >q ∗
H.T oh a v eq∗
H > 0, we need (RL − Rγ − L)+tH − tL > 0.    
28